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THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND
LIMITATIONS ON TAXATION: WHAT RAWLS
DEMANDS FROM TAX SYSTEMS
Linda Sugin*
INTRODUCTION
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, at the beginning of their
important book, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice ("The
Myth of Ownership"), describe a "dominant theme" of their analysis
as follows:
[T]he tax system cannot be evaluated by looking at its impact on
private property, conceived as something that has independent
existence and validity. Taxes must be evaluated as part of the
overall system of property rights that they help to create. Justice or
injustice in taxation can only mean justice or injustice in the system
of property rights and entitlements that result from a particular tax
regime.'
The book contains a devastating critique of traditional tax policy
analysis. It describes theories of vertical equity as "false" accounts of
governmental justice,2 and demolishes the principle of equal
sacrifice-a bulwark of fairness discussions in taxation-as
"myopi[c]," for "treat[ing] the justice of tax burdens as if [they] could
be separated from the justice of the pattern of government
expenditure."3 The Myth of Ownership carefully erases the baseline
so often employed in tax policy scholarship-pre-tax income and its
implications of entitlement.
To students of tax policy, The Myth of Ownership could be quite
disheartening. One could read the book as an argument for the
demise of all tax policy analysis, since it maintains that the tax
system's fairness cannot be measured in a vacuum apart from all other
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice 8
(2002).
2. Id. at 14.
3. Id. at 25.
4. In the authors' view, pre-tax income has no moral significance, and therefore
it is inappropriate for it to be accorded a presumption of entitlement in determining
the justice of any taxing scheme, which necessarily takes some part of pre-tax income
from the individual. Id. at 19.
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public institutions, and that taxes themselves affect markets and the
definition of private property. The authors claim that the tax system
"is among the conditions that create a set of property holdings, whose
legitimacy can be assessed only by evaluating the justice of the whole
system, taxes included."5 If they are right, there may be nothing to say
about justice and taxation at all; perhaps we can only evaluate more
comprehensive policies that consider all aspects of economic life.
If Murphy and Nagel are calling for the integration of tax policy
with everything else that might be considered government economic
policy,6 the task they- give policymakers is daunting. In such an
integration, it would be necessary to consider the entire scheme of
government protection of property rights and markets, government
provision of goods and services, along with taxation, to have any
coherent ideas about economic justice in society. There is too much
law on both the tax side and the expenditure side of the budget, not to
mention the regulation of all manner of economic life, to expect that
policymakers can constantly adjust the overall picture in accordance
with an ideal of distributive justice as they make every legal change.
It would be a Herculean task to consider any legal rule.
To those for whom taxation is a vitally important piece in what is
clearly a larger scheme of economic justice, the lesson from The Myth
of Ownership may be less dire. Given the extensive discussion of
individual issues in taxation,7 Murphy and Nagel themselves seem to
cling to the belief that it is possible to discuss justice in taxation, even
if it is not possible to achieve justice only through taxation. In fact,
their denial of any moral presumption of entitlement to pre-tax
income invites significantly higher levels of taxation than we currently
have, and a potentially more central role for taxation in achieving
economic justice through the political process.
Thus, rather than rejecting all tax policy analysis, The Myth of
Ownership requires a reassessment of traditional tax policy
approaches and an evaluation of the practical role of tax policy in
achieving distributive justice. I believe that the lessons of The Myth of
Ownership demand that we be less specific than we might hope about
the connection between taxes and justice. What follows from Murphy
5. Id. at 37.
6. Economists have long considered government expenditures together with
taxation, recognizing government transfer payments as both increased income for
individuals receiving them and also negative taxes from a fiscal perspective. See
Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice
216, 295 (5th ed. 1989). Murphy and Nagel seem to go beyond this relatively narrow
universe by expanding the relevant economic categories to all institutions that affect
property holdings. See, e.g., Murphy & Nagel, supra note 1, at 37.
7. The book contains considerable discussion of some of the most controversial
and current issues in tax policy: the tax base, progressivity, and estate taxation. See
Murphy & Nagel, supra note 1, at 96-129 (the tax base), 130-41 (progressivity), and
142-61 (estate taxation).
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and Nagel's argument is that no tax system, by itself, is capable of
carrying out a conception of economic justice, and fairness in
government cannot be determined by isolating elements of any tax
system. We need to ask less of tax policy analysis, but not abandon it
altogether.
Previously, tax policy analysts may have asked whether a theory of
distributive justice requires a particular tax policy, such as progressive
rates or a particular tax base. But progressive rates or a particular tax
base may not tell us much about the ultimate distribution of resources,
opportunities, income, or welfare in society.' Only in conjunction
with the myriad other rules and policies in place in any system can we
determine whether a society operates in an economically just manner.
Regardless of the progressivity of the tax or its base, the broad
combination of taxes, transfers, public goods, educational
opportunities, avenues for redress of economic harms, market
regulation, and the like are all part of the determination of whether,
for example, the poorest members of society are provided a basic
minimum that a just or even a decent society would provide.9 Neither
a progressive rate structure nor an income base can guarantee that
minimum, despite their general association with redistributive
policies. The tax system itself can never give us enough information to
determine whether any ideal is, in fact, being met.
Murphy and Nagel's critique prevents endorsement of specific tax
policies in the name of justice, but invites a different, narrower
inquiry: whether a particular tax system (or even tax provision)
precludes a just economic arrangement in society. For example, if the
tax system consisted of confiscating all the property of the poorest
20% of the population, no set of remaining government policies could
provide an overall economic distribution that liberal egalitarians
would consider just. Similarly, the injustice in a tax system that
required only black people to pay income taxes could not be cured by
any other combination of government institutions.
This Essay attempts to map out how such an inquiry would be
conducted in light of Rawls. Rather than searching in theories of
justice for required precepts of taxation, we might more fruitfully ask
8. Different theories of distributive justice would consider these various metrics
appropriate. See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An
Introduction 81-85 (1990) (describing the interpretation of equality as the
fundamental argument in contemporary political theory); Murphy & Nagel, supra
note 1, at 40-75; Amartya K. Sen, Inequality Reexamined 12 (1992) ("[Elvery
normative theory of social arrangement that has at all stood the test of time seems to
demand equality of something .... The theories involved are diverse and frequently
at war with each other").
9. 1 use this example simply because it is a principle that Murphy and Nagel
themselves seem to adopt. See Murphy & Nagel, supra note 1, at 134-35. Rawls does
as well. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 162 (Erin Kelly ed.,
2001).
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what constraints, if any, a particular theory of justice imposes on the
tax system. Application of such an approach to Rawls's theory of
justice may explain his apparent preference for a flat consumption-
based tax.' ° This preference is otherwise quite puzzling in light of
much of what Rawls wrote about economic justice, and might lead us
to expect him to endorse a progressive income tax. If Rawls's
discussion of economic justice is treated as offering limitations rather
than mandates for taxation, then a variety of tax systems may be part
of a just Rawlsian society, including a flat consumption-based tax.
Extension of this approach to other political theories might produce a
shorter list of acceptable taxes, depending on the extent to which the
chosen theory is likely to constrain government action.
I. RAWLS AND THE FLAT CONSUMPTION TAX
Rawls wrote a great deal about economic justice generally, but very
little about taxation in particular, and what he did say is puzzling.1
He preferred a consumption tax to an income tax,2 and he suggested
that such a tax could have flat rates. 3 This is surprising because
Rawls's broader conception of economic justice-e.g., the famous
difference principle-manifests great concern for the least advantaged
in society, and a flat, consumption-based tax is quite generous to the
rich, as compared to alternatives such as a progressive income or
wealth tax. 4 The architect of the difference principle, which demands
that inequalities must be justifiable on the ground that they benefit
the least well-off, may seem to be aligned, in matters of taxation, with
Steve Forbes and Dick Armey. 15 Does this make sense? I suggest
that it does if we understand Rawls's theory to allow a variety of tax
systems, depending on the other institutions of society and the
operation of non-tax policies. Under certain circumstances, a flat
consumption tax is perfectly consistent with Rawls's theory.
Barbara Fried examines the flat aspect of Rawls's suggested tax
scheme, and argues that a proportional (i.e., flat) tax seems clearly
10. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 246 (rev. ed. 1999) (explaining why a
proportional expenditure tax is preferable to an income tax).
11. Barbara Fried notes Rawls's "inexplicable enthusiasm" for a flat,
consumption-based tax. Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate
Taxation, 2 Chap. L. Rev. 157, 195 (1999).
12. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 10, at 246-47.
13. Id.; see also Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at 161.
14. Both the flat rate and the consumption base potentially relieve the tax burden
on the most well-off group compared to a progressive income tax because (1) under a
consumption tax, investment returns are effectively exempt, while wages are taxed in
full, and (2) the same flat rate applies to all taxed amounts, regardless of quantity.
15. See Dick Armey, The Flat Tax: A Citizen's Guide to the Facts on what It Will
Do for You, Your Country, and Your Pocketbook (1996); Neil A. Lewis, The Forbes
Pitch for a Flat Tax, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1996, at B8 (describing Steve Forbes's flat
tax proposal).
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misplaced in Rawls's theory. 6 She claims that Rawls's preference for
a flat tax on account of its treating everyone in a uniform way "stands
as an island of deontological rights swamped by a sea of
redistribution," and is undermined by Rawls's own approval of a
degressive tax, which is, in fact, progressive to some extent." She
maintains that a flat rate makes no logical sense in Rawlsian theory,
given the larger aims of the theory, and Rawls's view that income
earned on account of talents is not deserved."
Liberal egalitarians seem generally to favor progressive systems-
i.e., systems in which tax liability increases as a share of the base as the
base size increases." Murphy and Nagel ultimately endorse the
principle of progressivity on egalitarian, welfare-based grounds,
although they do not necessarily favor graduated rates."z Ronald
Dworkin's tax scheme, based on a hypothetical insurance model
derived from his theory of equality of resources, is also progressive.2 '
Utilitarians have also argued for progressivity on the theory that
society's utility could be maximized by taxing the rich (whose
marginal utility of income is low) more than the poor (whose marginal
16. Fried, supra note 11, at 185-86.
17. Id. at 185. A degressive tax is one in which rates are flat but exemptions or
demogrants are allowed, creating progressivity as a matter of overall effective rates of
tax. For example, a degressive tax could impose tax at a rate of 20%, but allow
everyone a personal exemption of $100. The taxpayer with $200 income would pay
$20 in tax, for an average rate of 10% tax, while the taxpayer with $2,100 income
would pay $400 in tax, for an average rate of 19%. Alternatively, the government
could transfer $20 to each taxpayer. In that case, the taxpayer with $400 income
would pay $40 tax but receive the $20 demogrant, for a net of $20. The taxpayer with
$2,100 income would pay $420 tax but receive $20, for a net tax of $400, producing the
same result as the exemption. Because average rates increase as income increases,
the system is progressive, even though the rate is flat. Rawls's description of his flat
tax allows for "an appropriate social minimum" which could be either in the form of
exemption or demogrant, and adjusted up or down as necessary to satisfy the
difference principle. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at 161-
62.
18. Fried, supra note 11, at 186.
19. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and
Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 Tax L. Rev. 363
(1996). This definition of progressivity indicates that the rate question is wholly
independent of the base question. Consumption taxes, as well as income taxes, can be
designed with progressive rates.
20. Murphy & Nagel, supra note 1, at 140-41. Following the optimal tax model,
Murphy and Nagel favor demogrants, which are cash transfers that operate to adjust
the effects of the tax system most dramatically at the lowest levels. Demogrants can
operate to provide significant levels of overall progressivity, including negative
average rates, even where the statutory rate of tax is proportional. See Joseph
Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at
Progressive Taxation, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1905 (1987). Despite the appeal of demogrants
in the academic literature, they are considered politically impossible. See Lawrence
Zelenak & Kemper Moreland, Can the Graduated Income Tax Survive Optimal Tax
Analysis?, 53 Tax L. Rev. 51, 60-62 (1999).
21. Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 283 (1981), reprinted in Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue 65 (2000).
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utility of income is presumably higher).2 Even Edward McCaffery, an
enthusiastic consumption tax proponent, argues that a progressive tax
is the most consistent with Rawls's principles.23
Nevertheless, a flat tax can be redistributive or not, depending on
the distribution of the base and the government's use of revenues.
For example, assuming equal government benefits to all, a flat tax on
wealth would be highly redistributive because the truly poor would
have no base to tax, and a person with modest wealth would pay a
much smaller tax than would a person of great wealth.24 Flat taxes are
not redistributive where the tax base is equal across taxpayers. For
example, a flat tax on everybody's grocery budget would not be nearly
as redistributive as the flat wealth tax because the rich spend more on
food than do the poor, but probably not a thousand times more
(assuming wealth was a thousand times as great). 25 Thus, from the
perspective of limitations, isolating the flat component yields little
information. A flat tax can be consistent with a redistributive theory
of economic justice.
What about a consumption base? Putting flat rates together with a
consumption base is less redistributive than a flat wealth tax. But it
might still be redistributive. A consumption base can be very flexible
in allocating tax burdens, and, therefore, is not controlling in
determining an overall level of redistribution in society.26  A
progressive consumption tax27 could easily be designed to impose a
22. Of course, a proportional tax does collect more money from a rich person than
from a poor person. The utilitarian case for progressive taxation depends on some
questionable assumptions. In addition to the assumption stated in the text about
relative marginal utilities, the case for progressivity depends on a very steep utility
curve. See F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 315-16 (1960); Richard A.
Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy 154-59 (1959);
Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 417 (1952); Fried, supra note 11, at 189 n.89.
23. Edward J. McCaffery, The Fair Timing of Tax 28 (Sept. 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=441344.
24. If a 3% wealth tax were levied on everyone in a society in which A has zero
wealth, B has 100, and C has 1,000,000, A would pay nothing, B would pay 3, and C
would pay 3000. Government benefits could be significantly skewed toward C and
still allow this tax to be redistributive.
25. For example, if a poor family making $25,000 a year spends $2,600 a year ($50
a week) on groceries, it is difficult to imagine that even a family making $25 million a
year would spend $2.6 million ($50,000 a week) on groceries.
26. The redistributive limitations often associated with consumption taxes are
political, rather than inherent.
27. There is nothing inherent in a consumption tax base that requires that it be
proportional. Some of the most serious proposals for consumption taxation have
contained progressive rates. See USA Tax Act of 1995, S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995);
David F. Bradford, Taxation, Wealth, and Saving 47, 69-70 (2000); Edward J.
McCaffery, Fair Not Flat: How to Make the Tax System Better and Simpler 101
tbl.6.1 (2002) (displaying progressive rate schedule for consumption tax proposal).
Senators Nunn and Domenici's proposed USA Tax had graduated rates of 19-27-40%
being reduced over five years to 8-19-40%. S. 722 § 15(a)(1)-(5). Even Hall and
Rabushka's Flat Tax is degressive in nature, and Representative Armey's proposal
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greater burden on the rich compared to the poor than would an
income tax with less progressive rates. Even a flat consumption-based
tax raises more revenue from the rich than the poor because rich
people can generally be counted on to consume more total goods and
services than poor people consume. Certainly, a consumption tax
would not preclude satisfaction of the difference principle in a society
in which all economic institutions were coordinated. The base
question seems even less central to Rawls's theory than the rate
structure because the base is at least as amenable as the rates to
variation in distribution, depending on other institutions and
circumstances. Rawls uses the tax system as a means of achieving
distributive justice, rather than as a requirement of justice itself-the
features of a tax system are not constitutional essentials.28
Thus, a consumption-based tax could form part of an integrated
governmental scheme that used revenues in a redistributive manner so
as to guarantee opportunity and improve the prospects of the least
well-off. If the proceeds of taxes collected are redistributed to
provide the greatest benefit to the least well-off-through whatever
mechanism, whether direct transfers, schools, health care, or other
programs that open opportunity and improve the prospects of the
poorest-then it matters little what the tax itself looks like because
the spending side of the budget corrects or adjusts the distributional
consequences overall.29 In Murphy and Nagel's terms, the entire fiscal
picture could inure to the benefit of the worst-off segment of society
and protect the basic liberties even if the tax system in isolation is
regressive as to income and wealth. The mechanism chosen on the
spending side is a question of effectiveness. From an efficiency
perspective, direct transfers may be the most desirable mechanism of
redistribution, but any integrated approach could achieve the overall
distributional goals of the society.
It might not even be necessary to explain how a flat consumption
tax could fit in a Rawlsian society because Rawls's "enthusiasm" for a
flat consumption tax may be overstated. His specific comments about
taxation are considerably more tentative than his general discussion of
distributive justice, and he could have easily offered a stronger
endorsement of flat consumption taxes than he did. His mention in A
Theory of Justice is offered thus: "Leaving aside many complications,
it is worth noting that a proportional expenditure tax may be part of
based on it contained an exemption of $10,700 for individual returns ($21,400 for joint
and surviving spouse returns). Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, H.R.
2060, 104th Cong. § 101 (1995); see also Armey, supra note 15; Robert E. Hall &
Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax (2d ed. 1995).
28. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 227-28 (1993) (stating that the fair equality of
opportunity and difference principles are not "constitutional essentials").
29. Fried, supra note 11, at 183-84; Murphy & Nagel, supra note 1, at 164;
Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 6, at 245.
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the best tax scheme."3 A few sentences later, he allows exemptions
for dependents, which creates progressivity, even if rates are
nominally flat.31 Then he continues: "It may be better.., to use
progressive rates only when they are necessary to preserve the justice
of the basic structure ...32 and concedes that if existing institutions
are unjust, then "steeply progressive income taxes" may be "justified
when all things are considered."33
In his later work, Rawls's penchant for a flat consumption tax
weakened. In Justice as Fairness, he consistently tempered his
discussions with statements such as: "the following remarks indicate
some of the kinds of taxation by which economic and social
background justice might be preserved,"34 and "the progressive
principle of taxation might not be applied,"3 and "income taxation
might be avoided altogether and a proportional expenditure tax
adopted instead."36 So, it seems that Rawls fell short of endorsing any
particular base or rate schedule, subordinating both the base question
and the progressivity question to larger questions of institutional
adequacy. Taxes are the mechanism by which the government raises
revenue, so that it can be spent in guaranteeing basic liberties and
satisfying the requirements of democratic equality, including the
difference principle.37
II. THEORY AS LIMITATION: THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE
Perhaps Rawls did not endorse or commit to the tax proposals that
he did mention because his analysis of philosophical principles does
not require commitment to any particular tax system at all. Numerous
tax systems could conceivably satisfy Rawls's principles of justice.
Looked at through the lens of The Myth of Ownership, the particular
design of the tax system is not Rawls's concern at the level of political
30. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 10, at 246.
31. Id. To illustrate the point, consider two people in a hypothetical flat
consumption tax with exemptions. A consumes $100, B consumes $30. If exemptions
are each worth $5 and they each have 4 exemptions, and the flat rate of tax is 20%, A
will pay tax of $16 ($100 consumption - $20 exemptions = $80 taxable consumption x
20% = $16 tax), while B will pay tax of $2 ($30 consumption - $20 exemptions = $10
taxable consumption x 20% = 2). While the statutory rate is a flat 20%, A pays tax at
an effective (average) rate of 16%, while B pays at an effective rate of only 6.6%.
Because A pays a greater proportion of consumption in tax than does B, the
hypothetical flat tax is actually progressive.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 246-47.
34. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at 160.
35. Id. at 161.
36. Id.
37. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 10, at 247 ("Proportional
expenditure (or income) taxes are to provide revenue for public goods, the transfer
branch and the establishment of fair equality of opportunity in education, and the
like, so as to carry out the second principle.").
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philosophy, as A Theory of Justice seems to be suggesting by not
committing his theory to the specific design of a tax system.
Ironically, in applying the perspective of limitations in designing a
tax system, Rawls's first principle of justice, which concerns equal
political liberties, is more important than his second principle, which
concerns economic arrangements. The second principle, which
demands that economic inequalities are justifiable only if they benefit
the least advantaged, can be satisfied through the combination of a
wide variety of institutions, of which the tax system is only one.
Inequalities in taxation that fail to benefit the most disadvantaged
may be outweighed by other economic arrangements and provisions
that benefit those who are worst-off. Only a tax system that burdens
exclusively the poorest group would be foreclosed on account of the
difference principle, because that scheme of public finance would
necessarily entail some redistribution, in the form of public goods at
least, from the worst-off to the better-off. The only major limitation
on a tax system demanded by the difference principle seems to arise
from the revenue needs of the basic structure as a whole; it would
preclude a system of taxation that collected insufficient total revenue
to support the public institutions that are necessary for fair equality of
opportunity, such as education and economic regulation.38 The
government must raise sufficient resources to provide a social
minimum.39 In isolation, Rawls does not apply the difference principle
to appraise any particular rate or base.4"
Perhaps justice as fairness is more concerned with sufficient
taxation than with the particular distribution of tax burdens.4 From
that perspective, the demands of justice on tax design are minimal, or
at least do not necessarily entail any particular arrangement. A
proportional tax could certainly raise enough revenue to provide for
substantial redistribution, both directly in the form of transfer
payments to the neediest members of society, and indirectly, through
the provision of public goods that disproportionately benefit the least
well-off.
38. Id. at 243.
39. See, e.g., id. at 244-45.
40. This conclusion may contradict Rawls's own statement in Justice as Fairness
that "[t]he difference principle might, then, roughly be satisfied by raising and
lowering [the exemption for a social] minimum and adjusting the constant marginal
[flat] rate of taxation." Rawis, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at
161. This suggests that the tax system, by itself, can roughly satisfy the difference
principle. Id. at 161-62.
41. This might be the most important point of contention concerning taxation
between Rawls and his critics. For example, the institutions which would be
necessary in the minimal state that Robert Nozick proposes would be considerably
more modest than those required in a Rawlsian state, and, therefore, require
considerably less revenue. Nozick argues that redistributive taxation is only
legitimate for the narrow purpose of providing protective services to everyone. See
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 52, 149 (1974).
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Focusing on sufficient taxation, even a lump-sum tax, which levies
an equal dollar charge on all individuals, could potentially satisfy
Rawls's requirements of justice as fairness. Sufficient taxation
depends on the operation of many institutions in society, and Rawls
imagined a system in which minimal taxation might be adequate. In
Justice as Fairness, he describes an economic system of property-
owning democracy, in which the background institutions of society
"work to disperse the ownership of wealth and capital, and thus to
prevent a small part of society from controlling the economy. 4 2 In its
ideal form, a property-owning democracy would not produce wide
disparities of income and wealth and a few privileged members of
society controlling most of the economic and social resources. "Under
these conditions[,] we hope that an underclass will not exist. .... ""
A property-owning democracy that manages to achieve the level of
cooperation and mutuality that Rawls envisioned requires little state
revenue for guaranteeing basic needs through redistribution. If the
existing institutions of society are just and operate to produce benefits
throughout the economic strata, government would need to fund the
institutions required to guarantee equality of opportunity. But there
would be no need for large-scale transfers to the least well-off, who
would presumably benefit from the operations of the economic system
that rewarded everyone for "doing their full share on terms
recognized by all as mutually advantageous and consistent with
everyone's self-respect.""
Under such circumstances, a small head tax might be acceptable. If
the proceeds of the tax were used to benefit the least well-off-with
the understanding that the disparity between the two is narrow-it
could satisfy the difference principle. The entire scheme might be
just, even if the tax portion, when isolated, seems quite unfair, which it
presumably would to someone who understands equality as Rawls
does.45
42. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at 139. In Justice as
Fairness, Rawls contrasted a "property-owning democracy" with "welfare-state
capitalism," the latter being less desirable because it allows greater concentration of
wealth and income and leaves an underclass outside the political culture. Id. at 139-40.
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls was less specific about economic institutions and
allowed that both socialism and property-owning democracy would be acceptable
systems, given his principles. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 10, at 234-42.
43. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at 140.
44. Id. at 139.
45. It is possible to argue that a head tax satisfies some conception of equality. It
levies an equal tax, in dollars, though clearly not an equal burden on individuals in
different economic circumstances. Most people who reject progressive taxation on
equality grounds opt for proportional taxation, rather than a head tax. See Blum &
Kalven, supra note 22, at 506-16. Jeffrey Schoenblum is the exception. He argues for
a head tax from a philosophical perspective, albeit not a Rawlsian one. See Jeffrey A.
Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases
for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 221 (1995).
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These observations reconciling various regressive tax schemes with
Rawls's principles may indicate something about Rawls's theory, but
little about the taxes considered.46  Rather than supporting a
particular tax base or rate structure, Rawls's theory of justice as
fairness (and other theories of economic justice) might be better
interpreted as providing limits to certain tax schemes. Rawls may
prohibit the state from raising revenue in a way that precludes
satisfaction of the difference principle, regardless of later
redistribution. But it may do no more than that. Scholars have
differed about which tax would satisfy Rawlsian principles precisely
because a wide variety of taxes could all be consistent with those
principles. This approach to taxation and theories of distributive
justice, though less determinate, provides a better analytical
framework than attempting to infer specific tax institutions from a
general political theory.
In keeping with this conference, this Essay focuses on Rawls, but
the same approach would be fruitful with respect to other theories of
distributive justice as well. Depending on the theory, the result would
not always be as inclusive as described here for Rawls. For example, a
libertarian theory, such as that described by Robert Nozick in
Anarchy, State and Utopia,47 would preclude most tax systems.
Nozick's principles of justice would not allow the state to interfere
with the private market, unless the state's action operated to correct
some past injustice in either acquisition or transfer. 4  Because
Nozick's theory severely curtails the role of the state, the revenue it
needs is minimal, and any tax system that raised it by coercion would
be suspect. Consent would be necessary, making a voluntary tax most
consistent and a benefits-based tax arguably acceptable.49
An example of this approach for Rawls is helpful. If a tax system
imposed a levy only on the poorest segments of the population, it
would be ruled out in a Rawlsian world because it would be
impossible for the overall scheme of government distribution to satisfy
the difference principle." By definition, in such a tax, there is
46. Barbara Fried's puzzlement at Rawls's embracing of a flat tax led her to
conclude that there must be a "powerful instinct" connected with proportionality.
Fried, supra note 11, at 186. That, of course, is another sympathetic reading of
Rawls's discussion of taxation.
47. Nozick, supra note 41.
48. Id. at 151.
49. Id. at 169-72 (explaining why taxation is equivalent to forced labor); see
Murphy & Nagel, supra note 1, at 16-19; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the
Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 Mich. L. Rev.
465, 491-97 (1987).
50. It might be possible, however, for a highly regressive tax to be part of a larger
institutional structure that is just if there are other taxes or fees that provide net
benefits to the worst-off class. This simply means that it is incomplete to isolate a
single tax, such as the federal income tax, and consider its distributional effects
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redistribution from the worst-off to all better-off groups because the
worst-off finance all public goods. Any transfer payments that come
from the pool collected from the lowest income group might
constitute redistribution between individuals, but would fail to
constitute redistribution between groups." Rawls's focus on groups is
a familiar approach in tax analysis, and important in applying the
limitations approach." If income (or wealth or consumption) is the
relevant criterion, then the focus on groups effectively isolates that
characteristic and treats all other characteristics of people as evenly
distributed across income groups.53 The difference principle could not
be satisfied with such a tax system, regardless of other government
programs, because the scheme could not be designed to benefit the
least advantaged group.
Extending this example, the difference principle might also
preclude a highly regressive tax,54 depending on the operation of
markets and other institutions in society. For example, consider a
highly regressive tax pursuant to which the lowest income taxpayers
paid tax at an average rate of 50%, while the highest income taxpayers
paid an average rate of 2%. Such a tax could raise more dollars from
the rich than the poor, depending on the income distribution prior to
the tax. The greater the inequality in market returns, the more tax
would be paid by the rich compared to the poor in this system. Could
the overall scheme of economic distribution and regulation benefit the
least well-off members of society despite a tax system, which, in
isolation, exhibits a pattern that is opposite Rawls's ideal? It depends
on the distribution of government benefits, and how that distribution
interacts with the tax system.
If we assume that other institutions provide significant benefits to
all, then high-income taxpayers would get considerable benefits from
without considering other taxes that are imposed by the same authority, such as the
federal payroll or estate tax.
51. This is an illustration in which Rawls's use of representatives, rather than
particular individuals, produces results that differ from one another, and it is clear, in
this case, that the focus on groups goes considerably further in establishing economic
justice for the society.
52. The IRS and economists often organize taxpayers into quintiles or deciles of
income. We have lately heard a fair amount about the top 1% or 2% and even the
top few. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Perfectly Legal: The Covert Campaign to Rig
Our Tax System to Benefit the Super Rich-and Cheat Everybody Else 30-44 (2003);
Joel Slemrod, Office of Tax Policy Research, The Fortunate 400 (July 17, 2003), at
http://www.otpr.org/fortunate400.pdf.
53. Of course, some characteristics are, in fact, highly correlated with income. For
example, the lowest income group is likely to be made up disproportionately of single
women of color, while the top earners are historically 100% white. See Joseph
Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, Winners and Losers in the Shift to a Consumption Tax,
86 Geo. L.J. 539, 559 (1998).
54. A regressive tax is one in which the average rate of tax declines as the base
(such as income) grows.
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the government and the tax system." The combination of widely
shared or evenly dispersed government benefits and highly regressive
taxes could be suspect in a Rawlsian conception. Under the
difference principle, benefits to high-income taxpayers are acceptable,
but only if the benefits flow down also, and where significant benefits
from government are enjoyed by the rich, the overall distribution of
benefits might not be sufficient to compensate the worst-off for the
heavy tax burden that they bear. On the other hand, if the benefits of
government are considered more modest, or have minimal value,56
then a regressive scheme might provide an overall distribution of
economic benefits that inures to the benefit of the worst-off. Thus,
even within the modest approach of looking for limitations, those
limitations depend on empirical determinations and moral judgments
about the non-tax institutions of society. Ironically, it may turn out
that the greater pre-tax income inequality that a society has, assuming
fair background institutions and markets, the more likely that a
regressive rate structure will satisfy the difference principle.57 This
might explain why the difference principle is only a limited part of the
analysis of tax systems under Rawls's theory.5 8
In assessing tax systems under this integrated approach, there are a
few issues that need to be resolved. For example, all taxes must be
aggregated because a highly regressive tax could be complemented by
a highly progressive tax, providing government revenue in a generally
proportional manner. The net total tax scheme would need to be
examined to determine whether a theory of justice limits the scheme
as a whole. This requirement applies Murphy and Nagel's
comprehensive perspective to the narrower question of limitations.
In addition, taxes and government benefits would need to be
identified if something less than all accrued gains (from whatever
source) are to be included in the analysis under the difference
55. This is the view of society endorsed by Murphy and Nagel. See Murphy &
Nagel, supra note 1, at 16-19.
56. John Stuart Mill seemed to be of this view when he described the benefits of
government as being highest for slaves. See John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political
Economy 171 (Jonathan Riley ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1848).
57. Consider this example: A society with fair background institutions and
markets produces pre-tax incomes of $1,000 for A and $10 for B. If B pays tax at
10%, he pays $1 in tax. If A pays tax at 5%, he pays $20 in tax. If the tax revenues
are used to provide government benefits that are equal for to all citizens, then the tax
scheme satisfies the difference principle because it redistributes from A to B to the
extent of $9.50. On the other hand, if pre-tax incomes are $20 for A and $10 for B,
then the same tax rates produce $1 of tax for each. If the taxes finance equal
government benefits, then the same schedule of rates fails to improve the position of
the least well-off. One objection to this example is that the levels of inequality in the
first example necessarily evidence a less fair institutional structure than the second, in
which incomes are more equal.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 65-91 for a discussion of the first principle.
It is a matter of some controversy how stringent or permissive the difference principle
is; I shall not enter that debate here.
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principle. If all gains are included, then the implication is that all
returns, regardless of source, are provided by the government.59 But if
some inequalities in market returns are acceptable in a just society-
and Rawls believed that they areQ---then in judging institutions of
government, we need to separate out socially created advantages from
those arising out of individual effort. The socially created advantages
must count in determining overall benefits and burdens from
government, and the calculus under the difference principle must
account for them, but the benefits from individual effort appropriately
produce inequalities in income and wealth, and should not require
adjustment under the difference principle. Only by defining the
universe of social benefits can we analyze whether the taxing scheme
permits a fair distribution of government benefits and burdens overall.
Although this definition may be a difficult task, there will be some
systems that veer so far from justice in background institutions that
the analysis is clear, and inequalities from markets arise from
monopoly or inequality in opportunities. Since Rawls is willing to
accept some inequality in economic outcomes if certain conditions are
satisfied, the implication is that there are some legitimate returns that
are outside the category of public justice and, therefore, outside the
tax and transfer scheme.
Some cases will be hard. For example, social security ("FICA") can
be described as an insurance scheme that contains some redistributive
elements. Over a lifetime, it redistributes from richer workers to
poorer workers, although richer workers contribute more into the
system and receive more out of the system in dollar terms.61 But it can
also be described as a pure tax in which today's workers subsidize
today's retirees- no actual fund is created for individual workers and
the system pays out amounts as they are received.62 As a tax, FICA is
highly regressive because it is imposed on a worker's first dollar and
contains an earnings cap.63 Average tax rates are flat from $1 in wages
until the cap is reached, and then decline as wages exceed the cap. On
the insurance model, FICA breezes through the difference principle,
59. This is a point on which philosophers differ. It is essentially the baseline issue
discussed by Murphy and Nagel. The position stated in the text, which makes
everything the government's before anything is yours, reflects the opposite extreme
from what many people understand as desert. The Myth of Ownership criticizes the
fulsome approach to desert, but stops short of turning it entirely on its head. See
Murphy & Nagel, supra note 1, at 35-37.
60. Rawls describes "open and workably competitive markets" as fair. Rawls,
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at 131; see also id. at 151. In A
Theory of Justice, he writes, a "significant advantage of a market system is that, given
the requisite background institutions, it is consistent with equal liberties and fair
equality of opportunity." Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 10, at 240-41.
61. Daniel Shaviro, Making Sense of Social Security Reform 69-71 (2000).
62. Id. at 88-89.
63. It is a wage tax, so non-wage income is exempt by design, exacerbating the
regressivity as to income. See id. at 12.
2004 [Vol. 72
2004] WHAT RAWLS DEMANDS FROM TAX SYSTEMS 2005
but on the tax model, additional taxes or institutions are necessary to
determine whether the regressivity of the tax is isolated or present
throughout the system. FICA is a much more troublesome institution.
Thus, the analyses of constraints on the tax system that arise from
the difference principle are largely dependent on factors arising
outside the tax system. There are virtually no absolute judgments that
can be made about the tax system from the requirements of the
difference principle. In fact, if background institutions were just and
markets operated to produce universal equality in income and wealth,
the difference principle would not require any tax for its achievement.
In a society "beyond justice,"'  taxation would only be about
providing government financing for public goods and operations;
redistribution simply would be unnecessary.
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE TAX STRUCTURE FROM RAWLS'S FIRST
PRINCIPLE
The most significant limitations on the tax structure come from
Rawls's first principle of justice, which guarantees political liberties
and has priority over the second principle's promise of economic
justice. While tax scholars have searched the difference principle for a
framework, they are most successful where it is supplemented by
another model into which the difference principle can be incorporated
for measurement.65 A more compelling influence on the broad design
of a tax structure comes from the first principle.
The first principle may impose significant limitations on systems of
taxation because it demands that every individual have equal basic
liberties. Based on this limitation, justice as fairness would preclude
an endowment tax, which taxes people according to their abilities to
earn, regardless of the actual choices they make to earn. Protection of
individual autonomy, not economic justice, drives the limitation. In
addition, the first principle precludes any tax system that allows
economic inequalities to interfere with the integrity of the political
system. Thus, where concentrations of wealth produce concentrations
of political power, the first principle would require the tax system to
break up politically threatening concentrations of wealth so that equal
liberties of citizenship are possible. 6
In Justice as Fairness, Rawls stated the first principle as: "Each
person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of
64. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at 177.
65. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 20, at 1955 (applying Rawls's leximin
within the optimal tax model).
66. Similarly, the first principle would support campaign finance regulation in
furtherance of a principle of equal participation. See Rawls, Political Liberalism,
supra note 28, at 359-63 (criticizing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
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equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same
scheme of liberties for all . .. "67 The basic liberties consist of:
freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; political liberties (for
example, the right to vote and participate in politics) and freedom of
association, as well as the rights and liberties specified by the liberty
and integrity (physical and psychological) of the erson; and finally,
the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law.
The priority of these basic liberties, which can be threatened by
economic power, provides significant and specific demands on the tax
system. The tax system must protect the scheme of basic liberties in
two ways: (1) taxation itself may not violate any of the basic liberties,
and (2) the tax system may not allow other institutions with which it
interacts, such as the market, to violate any basic liberties.
From these principles, it becomes clear that any tax that itself
compromises political rights, personal integrity, or freedom of thought
is off limits. Thus, a tax on people with particular political or moral
views would be prohibited, as would a poll tax that disenfranchised
the poor. But Rawls's first principle also precludes tax systems that
are less transparently hostile to the basic liberties, and an endowment
tax, even though it does not target the basic liberties, would
nevertheless be incompatible with a Rawlsian conception. In
addition, any society in which the wealth of some individuals threatens
any of the basic liberties of others may require taxation to protect the
threatened individuals. Thus, it is clear that an inheritance tax might
be necessary in a society in which economic power constrains political
participation or personal integrity.
Economists like endowment taxes because, unlike income and
consumption taxes, endowment taxes would not distort the
labor/leisure choice.69  Endowment taxation adopts an ex ante
perspective, compared to most forms of taxation currently in use,
which take an ex post perspective. v To a welfarist, any ex ante tax
might be problematic because it ignores outcomes. But ex ante taxes
67. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at 42.
68. Id. at 44.
69. David F. Bradford & U.S. Treasury Tax Policy Staff, Blueprints for Basic Tax
Reform 36-37 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter Bradford, Blueprints]; David F. Bradford,
Untangling the Income Tax 154-56 (1986); Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 6, at
291-93; Louis Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 Va. L. Rev.
1477, 1498-99 (1994). Murphy and Nagel reject an endowment tax for different
reasons than those discussed in the text. They argue that an endowment tax is not
about fairness at all, but about utility and wealth maximization. Murphy & Nagel,
supra note 1, at 23.
70. Different consumption tax proposals vary on the perspective. Cash flow
consumption taxes are ex post. Wage taxes, which are equivalent to cash flow
consumption taxes under certain moderately unrealistic assumptions, are ex ante. It
has been argued an income tax, which appears ex post, actually operates as an ex ante
tax. See Noel B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax
Base, 52 Tax L. Rev. 17, 34-35 (1996).
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would not necessarily be problematic in a Rawlsian society because
the background institutions of society are designed to provide
continuous procedural justice, rather than equality of welfare.71
Nevertheless, an endowment tax is problematic from the standpoint
of Rawls's conception of justice because of the obligations that it
places on individuals to earn enough money to pay the tax.
Particularly well-endowed individuals would be deprived of the
opportunity to choose their own life plans if those plans would
provide insufficient funds to pay their tax liability. In Some Reasons
for the Maximin Criterion, Rawls discusses a "head tax on natural
assets,"7 by which he clearly means an endowment tax. He writes:
[G]reater natural talents are not a collective asset in the sense that
society should compel those who have them to put them to work for
the less favored. This would be a drastic infringement upon
freedom. But society can say that the better endowed may improve
their situations only on terms that help others. This way inequalities
are permitted in ways consistent with everyone's self-respect.
Similarly, in his Reply to Alexander and Musgrave,74 Rawls rejects
endowment taxation, explaining:
It seems doubtful, in fact, whether natural abilities even exist in a
form that could be measured, even theoretically, for purposes of
lump sum taxation.... [P]otential earning capacity is not something
independent from the social forms and the particular contingencies
over the course of life, and the idea of a lump sum tax does not
apply.75
Finally, in Justice as Fairness, he offers his most precise objection:
[An endowment tax] would violate the priority of liberty. It would
force the more able into those occupations in which earnings were
high enough for them to pay off the tax in the required period of
time; it would interfere with their liberty to conduct their life within
the scope of the principles of justice.... The point is clear and
brings out a further aspect in which our native endowments are ours
71. Rawls's index of primary goods is not a measure of welfare. See John Rawls,
Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, 88. Q.J. Econ. 633 (1974), reprinted in John Rawls,
Collected Papers 232 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) [hereinafter Rawls, Reply]. Ex
ante taxes might be suspect under the difference principle, which considers outcomes.
In addition, Rawls would assure a decent social minimum covering basic needs, which
also concerns outcomes. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9,
at 162.
72. John Rawls, Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion, 64 Am. Econ. Rev. 141
(1974), reprinted in John Rawls, Collected Papers 225, 231 (Samuel Freeman ed.,
1999) [hereinafter Rawls, Reasons]. In Justice as Fairness, Rawls also refers to a
"head tax" but it is evident that he means an endowment-based tax rather than a
lump-sum equal tax for everyone, which is what the tax literature generally calls a
head tax. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at 157-58.
73. Rawls, Reasons, supra note 72, at 231.
74. Rawls, Reply, supra note 71.
75. Id. at 253.
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and not society's: namely, that we cannot be subject to [an
endowment tax] to equalize the advantages our endowments might
confer. That would violate our basic liberties. 76
Thus, it is clear that Rawls's theory precludes the adoption of an
endowment tax because of the dangers to liberty that it poses.77 Some
philosophers would extend this reasoning to all taxation,78 but Rawls's
approach is more moderate, and prohibits only taxes that interfere
with the basic liberties.79 Although an endowment tax might not be
arbitrary, it is unacceptably intrusive and burdensome precisely where
Rawls requires that society allow individuals to form their own plans
and control their own actions.
In addition to prohibiting an endowment tax, Rawls's first principle
might suggest other limitations on taxation, depending upon other
institutions of society and the existing pattern of income and wealth.
For example, given the current, actual distribution of income and
wealth,80 a tax system consisting solely of a consumption tax threatens
to encroach on the first principle. This is because a consumption tax
allows unlimited accumulations of wealth.81 Rawls allows only a
limited gain to the most favored group "on the assumption that, even
if the difference principle would allow it, there would be unjust effects
on the political system and the like excluded by the priority of
liberty."82  Thus, a general consumption tax might need to be
supplemented to safeguard the first principle and prevent the power
76. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at 158.
77. After explaining his practical and theoretical objections to an endowment tax,
Rawls writes, "All this is bad enough, but the situation is even worse if we ask at what
time of life the tax is to be assessed." Rawls, Reply, supra note 71, at 253. The
implication of this terse statement is that any injustice in attempting to measure
natural abilities and tax them is increased by doing so prior to the time at which
individuals turn these contingencies into actual measurable benefits. In Justice as
Fairness, Rawls identifies another objection connected to timing and practical
application of such a tax: "[P]eople will have a strong incentive to conceal their
endowments, as well as a strong incentive not to realize them until after the age at
which the tax is imposed." Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at
158. This sort of objection to an endowment tax is the more traditional, practical
objection. Rawls's most compelling objections seem to go further.
78. Robert Nozick views all taxation of labor as enslavement. Nozick, supra note
41, at 169.
79. He stresses this point in Reply to Musgrave and Alexander. Rawls, Reply,
supra note 71, at 252.
80. See Robert Greenstein & Isaac Shapiro, Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities,
The New, Definitive CBO Data on Income and Tax Trends 6 (Sept. 23, 2003)
(reporting that the "2.8 million people who made up the top one percent of the
population received more after-tax income in 2000 than did the 110 million
Americans in the bottom 40 percent of the population"), at http://www.cbpp.org/9-23-
03tax.pdf.
81. While an income tax allows significant accumulation of wealth as well, it has
been recognized to operate as a tax on wealth. See Cunningham, supra note 70, at 17;
Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 Yale
L.J. 1081, 1097-101 (1980).
82. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 10, at 70.
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associated with money from interfering with the basic liberties. Some
form of a wealth tax would likely be necessary.s3
Unlike the prohibition of an endowment tax, which I argue is
absolute in a Rawlsian conception, the necessity for a wealth tax is
contingent on the existing arrangements in society. If accumulations
of wealth do not develop, or if accumulations do not threaten the
basic liberties, there is no need for a wealth tax. Rawls imagines a
world in which wealth and income inequality is not as large as
currently observed. In such a society, there is less need for any
redistributive taxation because "[p]roperty-owning democracy...
ensur[es] the widespread ownership of productive assets and human
capital (that is, education and trained skills)."' But Rawls recognizes
that "background institutions must work to keep property and wealth
evenly enough shared over time to preserve the fair value of the
political liberties[,] ... [and] devices such as taxes[] [are necessary] to
prevent excessive concentrations of private power." 5
Specifically, Rawls endorses an accessions tax, 6 which levies a tax
on recipients of bequests, not for the purpose of raising government
revenue, "but solely to prevent accumulations of wealth that are
judged to be inimical to background justice."" His focus on
recipients, rather than donors, who are the focus in an estate tax, may
fairly be connected to the content of background justice, in particular,
equal opportunity, and to the problem of justice between generations.
Equal opportunity is an element of both of Rawls's principles of
justice: The opportunity to participate in the political system, and
achieve power in that system, is part of the first principle, while
economic opportunity is a component of the second principle.8
Because equal opportunity must be renewed at every generation, an
accessions tax may be preferable to an estate tax because it is sensitive
to the concentrations of individual wealth going forward. If the
allocations of resources that develop over time produce
concentrations of wealth that prevent equal opportunities across
generations, then taxation would be necessary to readjust those
opportunities at every generation. 9
Contingent on the operation of the institutions in society, a wealth
83. Edward McCaffery has argued that a consumption tax, without a wealth tax,
would be the best institutional embodiment of Rawls's principles. See, e.g., Edward J.
McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 Yale L.J. 283 (1994).
84. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at 139.
85. Id. at 51 (citation omitted).
86. Any form of wealth tax would probably satisfy Rawls's policies. The text
discusses his particular references, but a periodic wealth tax, which breaks up
dangerous accumulations regularly during a person's lifetime, might be most effective
in achieving the goals of a wealth tax.
87. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at 160-61.
88. See, e.g., id. at 149.
89. Id. at 51-52.
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tax might not need to collect any revenue; it can operate as insurance
against the potential dangers of unequal concentrations of wealth. If
inequalities in wealth accumulation over time do not interfere with
the fairness of background institutions, then inheritance taxation
might not be necessary.9" A single society might need such a tax at
different periods in its history. Because a just society can have
significant disparities in wealth and income,91 those disparities only
trigger the requirement of a tax where they threaten the basic
institutions. Inequalities in wealth and welfare among individuals
within generations is not unjust, as long as those inequalities do not
result from flaws in the basic structure that allow unfair advantages to
some individuals. Thus, taxation may have its most compelling role as
a mechanism to adjust institutions across generations.
IV. CHOOSING AMONG TAX STRUCTURES
If we start with the perspective of limitations and recognize that
many different structures of taxation might be acceptable from the
standpoint of Rawls's conception, how do we decide which tax
structure to choose as a matter of legislative prerogative? It should be
clear from the preceding analysis that it is largely contingent on the
economic structure of society, the levels of inequality of wealth and
income, and the relationship between inequalities in wealth and
income and opportunity in both the public and private spheres.
Given the inequalities that currently exist in the real world and the
way that markets actually function, the constraints that Rawls's
principles of justice impose on the tax system may be substantial. If
markets operate to increase inequalities, and the prospects of the least
advantaged are not chain-connected' to the prospects of the most
advantaged, then the tax system carries a particularly large burden
among the institutions of society to correct economic injustices. While
the perspective of limitations seems to impose few requirements for a
tax system, it demands more as the other institutions of society are
treated as fixed. Justice as fairness begins to preclude more tax
structures as society becomes more determined. The further we move
from the original position, and the more imperfect the economic and
social institutions actually are, the more limitations the tax system
faces from Rawls's theory.
In Justice as Fairness, the economic system described as property-
owning democracy is sufficiently ideal that no taxation at all may be
necessary to adjust the distribution of income and wealth." In a
90. See id. at 53.
91. Rawls is entirely clear about this. He writes that a guarantee of equal income
and wealth is "irrational." Id. at 151.
92. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 10, at 70-73 (discussing concepts of
"chain connection" and "close-knitness").
93. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 9, at 139.
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perfectly operating society, the institutions of cooperation would
distribute income and wealth in a manner that allowed greater gains
to some, but some gains to all, as a matter of course. This is because
"the background institutions.., work to disperse the ownership of
wealth and capital, and thus to prevent a small part of society from
controlling the economy, and indirectly, political life as well."94 The
difference principle could be satisfied in a market economy in which
the least well-off are able to invest their human capital in productive
ways so that they are entitled in the market to the benefits of society's
productivity along with the most advantaged. In such a society,
"reciprocity is owed"95 to the least advantaged, and their prospects
improve along with everyone else's. In such a society, taxation as a
tool of distributive justice is much diminished because it is not
necessary to achieve equality of opportunity or satisfy the difference
principle. Taxation may serve only as a revenue-raising tool.
But in the real world, wealth and capital are not widely dispersed,
and reciprocity is rarely to the least advantaged, so Rawls's broader
principles might lead to a more distributive tax system. In particular,
Rawls's assumption of "chain connection" and "close-knitness"96
minimize the task of the policymaker. Where there is chain
connection, and where "expectations are close-knit," improving the
expectations of the least advantaged would improve the expectations
of everyone else as well.97 If chain connection held and expectations
really were close-knit, then we could reach the same policy
recommendations by alternatively focusing on the most advantaged,
and inferring that their enrichment would likewise enrich the worst-
off as well. Economic benefits would necessarily be distributed across
the income spectrum. As a matter of fact, there is no evidence that
chain connection actually operates,98 and tax benefits enjoyed by the
rich do not seem to improve the lot of the poor.99 Therefore, in
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 10, at 71. Expectations are close-knit
where there are no discontinuities between the expectations of different
representative men. Where expectations are close-knit, as expectations improve for
one group, they also improve for other groups. In the curves that Rawls drew of the
expectations of the least and next-least favored representative men, "[a]t each point
both curves are either rising or falling." Id.
97. Id. at 70.
98. Press Release, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Two Decades of
Extraordinary Gains for Affluent Americans Yield Widest Income Gaps Since 1929,
New Data Indicate 2 (Sept. 23, 2003) (reporting that between 1979 and 2000, the
average after-tax income of the top 1% rose 201%, while the lowest fifth rose less
than 9%), at http://www.cbpp.org/9-23-03tax-pr.pdf.
99. Greenstein & Shapiro, supra note 80, at 13 tbl.6 (reporting that the 2001 and
2003 tax cuts resulted in a 5.4% increase in the after-tax income of millionaires, as
opposed to an increase of only 0.2% for the bottom quintile).
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Rawls's view, the least well-off must explicitly be given the greatest
consideration."°
Another problem in applying Rawlsian principles to the real world
arises from Rawls's assumptions about the "common pool. 101
Professors Murphy and Nagel question the intellectual origins as well
as the wisdom of the common pool argument, 0 2 and the common pool
as a descriptive matter seems largely untenable today. In small
communities, the common pool argument may have resonated, but in
a global economy, it seems far-fetched to suggest that the resources an
individual invests (in any way) translate into specific benefits for
identifiable others. Nevertheless, the common pool argument is quite
powerful in the real world of tax law. The last decade has seen a
subtle and gradual, but undeniable shift away from taxing investment;
savings for all sorts of purposes have disappeared from the base,
privileging investment income compared to wage income, a hallmark
of consumption taxation as compared to wage.10 3
One of the fundamental problems with the common pool in Rawls's
theory is that it allows a benefit to accrue to the most advantaged, and
relies on the market to distribute those benefits to everyone else. The
most recent tax legislation provides a good illustration of how the
100. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 10, at 69-70.
101. This assumption is that invested savings inure to the benefit of others, as well
as the owner of those investments. An income tax taxes everything earned, whether
saved or spent, while a consumption tax only taxes amounts spent on private,
preclusive consumption, so a belief in the value of the common pool supports a
preference for consumption taxation. Only personal, preclusive consumption-which
benefits only the consumer-need be taxed. The common pool is a venerable notion
that traces its origin to Hobbes, and has proved persuasive to many consumption tax
proponents including John Stuart Mill, Nicholas Kaldor, and some influential thinkers
in the Treasury Department. See Bradford, Blueprints, supra note 69, at 47 (noting
that moving to a consumption base would "remove a distortion that discourages
capital formation ... [and lead] to a higher U.S. growth rate in the short run, and a
permanently higher capital/output ratio in the long run"); Nicholas Kaldor, An
Expenditure Tax 53 (1993) (noting that a consumption tax "would tax people
according to the amount which they take out of the common pool" because "[i]t is
only by spending, not by earning or saving, that an individual imposes a burden on the
rest of the community in attaining his own ends"); Mill, supra note 56, at 180
(concluding that by investing, the rich "divert their income from the supply of their
own wants, to a productive investment, through which.., it is distributed in wages
among the poor"). The belief that taxes should be levied according to one's standard
of living is an outgrowth of the common pool argument.
102. Murphy & Nagel, supra note 1, at 109-12.
103. Under current law, savings may grow free of tax if they are in retirement
accounts (sections 401, 403, and 408A of the Internal Revenue Code), or accounts
dedicated to education (sections 529 and 530) or medical expenses (section 220), and
investments in machinery and equipment are now subject to a negative rate of tax
(yes, that means the government will pay you!). See Calvin H. Johnson, Depreciation
Policy During Carnival: The New 50 Percent Bonus Depreciation, 100 Tax Notes 713,
714 (2003) (describing how the bonus depreciation allowance enacted in the Tax
Relief Act of 2003 provides a negative tax, or direct subsidy, of 27% for debt-financed
investments in equipment).
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market often fails to do that. It primarily reduced the rate of tax on
dividends and capital gains as part of a proclaimed effort to create
jobs for people who were not the direct beneficiaries of the
legislation."° These tax cuts only translate into benefits for poor and
middle-income people if the tax savings are invested in domestic jobs
and industries that serve poor and middle-income people, and it is not
clear that the recent cuts are creating secondary beneficiaries. 15
In addition, there is only a net improvement in the well being of the
least well-off if tax-savings induced jobs and programs provide greater
benefits than government programs could have provided with the lost
tax revenue. A central flaw of the common pool argument in current
application is that it seems to ignore the alternative of the public
sector. While high-income taxpayers might invest their savings
overseas, the government could have targeted those funds more
precisely through direct appropriations. Thus, the legislative
application of the common pool idea, as illustrated in the 2003 Act, is
inconsistent with Rawls's second principle of justice. By actively
increasing the benefits to the most advantaged, and leaving the least
advantaged at the mercy of the market, the policies carrying out the
common pool idea fail to consider the actual consequences of
government actions on the least well-off. Without chain connection
and secondary market beneficiaries, in practice, any Rawlsian support
for a flat, consumption tax becomes significantly weaker.
CONCLUSION
This focus on limitations rather than mandates should not suggest
that all potentially acceptable tax systems would be equally effective
in achieving a particular vision of distributive justice. I have tried to
show how Rawls's theory presents different constraints on the design
of a tax system, depending on other background institutions. A
society with a progressive income tax may need fewer total
government programs to achieve an acceptable level of economic
inequality in a Rawlsian conception. The less that government is able
to integrate separate programs in an overall distributive scheme
effectively, the greater redistributive burden the tax system must bear.
In theory, the particular design of the tax system might not matter
much in determining whether there is a just overall societal
distribution. But, in fact, it matters a great deal. For better or for
worse, the tax law is the major tool of redistribution we have. Tax
policy debate is one of very few areas of the law in which discussions
104. President Bush described his tax cuts as a program of "job creation." Patti
Mohr, Bush Takes on Tax Cut Critics, Predicts Economic Recovery, 100 Tax Notes
610, 610 (2003); Daniel Altman, Recession Is Over; Jobs Aren't Trickling Down, N.Y.
Times, July 18, 2003, at C1. The 2003 tax cut was on top of the 2001 tax cut, which cut
marginal rates, and repealed the estate tax, which, by definition, only affects the rich.
105. See Altman, supra note 104.
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of distributive justice are considered appropriate. The political reality
is that most other economic regulation is oriented towards
maximization of wealth, rather than its distribution. 10 6 The tax law
comes in after productivity is maximized, and it should-to some
extent at least-rearrange the results produced by markets that
operate to concentrate wealth and opportunity.0 7
Murphy and Nagel clearly recognize the centrality of taxes to the
real-world question of distributive justice. 108 On the one hand, their
insistence that pre-tax market outcomes provide individuals with no
presumptive ownership claims 9 lowers the bar for arguments in favor
of taxation of all kinds. Without such a presumption in the way, we
only need to make arguments about the desirability of a tax according
to whatever theory we believe most persuasive, whether it be
Rawlsian, utilitarian, or even religious." ° But, at the same time, the
demands of their analysis to treat the tax system as one component in
a larger, integrated scheme of distributive justice subordinates the tax
system and weakens its institutional role, as the application of their
approach to Rawls's theory illustrates. The irony of Murphy and
Nagel's argument is that in their concern for distributive justice, they
possibly discount the one real-world tool that is regularly employed
toward achieving it. As they recognize in the beginning of their book,
anyone who cares about distributive justice in the real world needs to
pay close attention to taxation. It remains the most likely mechanism
to address rising income inequality, wealth concentration, and the
dangers to basic liberties that those economic patterns present.
106. For example, the securities laws' focus on disclosure is directed toward
maximization of market results.
107. This is appropriate according to utilitarians. See Louis Kaplow, A
Fundamental Objection to Tax Equity Norms: A Call for Utilitarianism, 48 Nat'l Tax
J. 497 (1995).
108. Murphy & Nagel, supra note 1, at 3-7.
109. This is the myth of ownership to which the book's title refers. See id.
110. Susan Pace Hamill makes such an argument for progressivity, which was
apparently important in the recent Alabama referendum on tax reform (alas, voted
down). See Susan Pace Hamill, An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-
Christian Ethics, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 1 (2002); David M. Halbfinger, G.O.P. Chiefs Idea
for Raising Alabama: Taxes, N.Y. Times, June 4, 2003, at A26 (quoting the governor
of Alabama as saying that "[h]aving a regressive tax structure is one thing," but that
"when it starts at $4,600 for a family of four, that's immoral").
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